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Abstract
Recent results have shown the usefulness of tamper-proof hardware tokens as a setup
assumption for building UC-secure two-party computation protocols, thus providing broad
security guarantees and allowing the use of such protocols as buildings blocks in the modular
design of complex cryptography protocols. All these works have in common that they assume
the tokens to be completely isolated from their creator, but this is a strong assumption. In
this work we investigate the feasibility of cryptographic protocols in the setting where the
isolation of the hardware token is weakened.
We consider two cases: (1) the token can relay messages to its creator, or (2) the creator
can send messages to the token after it is sent to the receiver. We provide a detailed char-
acterization for both settings, presenting both impossibilities and information-theoretically
secure solutions.
Keywords: Hardware Tokens, Isolation Assumption, UC security, One-Time Memory,
Oblivious Transfer.
1 Introduction
Tamper-proof hardware tokens are a valuable resource for designing cryptographic protocols.
It was shown in a series of recent papers that tamper-proof hardware tokens can be used as a
cryptographic setup assumption to obtain Universally Composable (UC) [5] secure two-party
computation protocols [20, 22, 18, 17, 13], thus achieving solutions that are secure according
to one of the most stringent cryptographic models and can be used as buildings blocks in the
modular design of complex cryptography protocols. Do¨ttling et al. [13] showed that even a single
tamper-proof hardware token generated by one of the mutually distrusting parties is enough to
obtain information-theoretical security in the UC framework.
All these works have in common that the tokens are assumed to be completely isolated
from their creator. In light of recent events this assumption becomes questionable at the least,
apart from the fact that the tokens could contain internal clocks, which can be exploited in
conjunction with the activation time to send information into the device (or to make the abort
behavior dependent on the activation time, which is not modeled in the UC framework). We
highlight that this problem lies skew to leakage and side-channel attacks, e.g. [2, 26], where
a malicious token receiver tries to extract some of the contents of the token, i.e. the tamper-
resilience assumption is weakened. In contrast, we consider a weakened isolation assumption.
A similar scenario was studied by Damg˚ard et al. [11], but only for a bandwidth-restricted
channel and computational security. They showed that a partial physical separation of parties,
e.g. in a token with a low-bandwidth covert channel, allows to perform UC-secure multiparty
computation under standard cryptographic assumptions.
We consider an unrestricted channel and information-theoretical security. In this scenario,
communication in both directions between the token and its creator without any restriction
obviously renders the token useless as a setup assumption. Thus, there remain two different
kinds of communication that can be considered to weaken the isolation assumption: either the
tokens’ creator can send messages to the tokens, or the tokens can send messages to their creator.
While we deem the first case to be more realistic, we consider both cases. We emphasize that
these one-way channels are available only for malicious parties and thus are not used by the
honest parties during the protocol execution. This scenario is not directly comparable with the
one by Damg˚ard et al. [11], since here a broadband communication channel is available, but it
is only one-way. This leads to the following question:
Is it possible to obtain UC-secure protocols even if there exists a broadband one-way
communication channel between the tokens and their creator?
In this work, we provide a broad characterization from a feasibility standpoint for both
malicious incoming and outgoing communication between the tokens and their creator. For our
solutions, we only require that one party can create hardware tokens. We thus call this party
Goliath, while the receiver of the token is called David and cannot create tokens of its own.
In more detail, we show that with one-way channels into the tokens, it is possible to basically
use the One-Time Memory (OTM) protocol using two tokens of Do¨ttling et al. [13] to obtain
an information-theoretically UC-secure OTM with aborts (i.e., a malicious token creator can
change the abort behavior of the token at runtime, which is unavoidable if one-way channels
into the tokens are available) and we also provide a computationally UC-secure OTM protocol
from a single token. Additionally, it is possible to obtain information-theoretically UC-secure
Oblivious Transfer (OT) from a single hardware token. We prove an impossibility result for
unconditionally secure OTM with a single token.
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Concerning one-way channels from the tokens to their creator, we show that it is impossible
to obtain even information-theoretically secure OT. We provide an information-theoretically
UC-secure commitment scheme, which can then be used to obtain a computationally UC-secure
OTM protocol with known techniques [25].
Further related work. Apart from the model of tamper-proof hardware as formalized
by Katz [20], also weaker models such as resettable hardware tokens were proposed, e.g. [18].
With resettable hardware, it is not possible to obtain information-theoretically secure oblivi-
ous transfer [17], while commitments are still possible [17, 12]. Thus, the main focus of this
research direction are efficient protocols based on computational assumptions while minimizing
the amount of communication and tokens [6, 18, 21, 2, 14, 8]. Further results about hardware
tokens can be founded in [7, 3, 9, 19, 15, 1].
Another UC hardware setup assumption are physically uncloneable functions (PUFs) [24,
4, 23], which have recently gained increasing interest. It was shown that PUFs can be used to
achieve oblivious transfer [27] and UC-secure commitments [12]. However, if the PUFs can be
created maliciously, oblivious transfer is impossible [10].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use standard information-theoretic measures: by H(·) we denote Shannon entropy, H(·|·)
denotes conditional entropy and I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information. Let in the following λ
denote a security parameter. We use the cryptographic standard notions of negligible functions,
as well as computational/statistical/perfect indistinguishability.
2.2 Model
We state and prove our results in the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti [5]
that allows for arbitrary composition of protocols. In this framework an ideal functionality
F that captures the desired security requirements has to be modeled. A protocol Π that is
supposed to instantiate F runs in the real world, where an adversary A can corrupt protocol
parties. To prove the UC-security of Π, it has to be shown that there exists a simulator S that
only interacts with the ideal functionality and simulates the behavior of any A in such a way
that any environment Z that is plugged either into the real protocol or the simulated protocol
cannot distinguish the real protocol run of Π from a simulated one.1 For our results we assume
static corruption, i.e. the adversary cannot adaptively corrupt protocol parties.
Target Functionalities. Ideally one would like to use tamper-proof hardware tokens to realize
One-Time Memory (OTM) [16], as in the case where the token is modeled as being completely
isolated from its creator [13]. See Figure 1 for the OTM functionality definition. This primitive
resembles oblivious transfer, but the receiver can make his choice at any point in time and the
sender is not notified about this event. OTM allows to build One-Time Programs [16, 18].
Impossibility of Realizing OTMs. Note that in the hybrid execution with a token and a
channel into the token, a dishonest sender G has the ability to send an abortion message to T at
any time, thus changing its abort behavior. In the ideal execution on the other hand, once the
OTM functionality goes to the ready state, it is not possible to change its output/abort behavior
1In the case of computational security we allow the simulator to be expected polynomial time.
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Functionality FOTM
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The variable Fstate is initialized with wait.
Creation. Upon receiving a message (create, sid, G,D, s0, s1) from G verify if Fstate = wait and s0, s1 ∈
{0, 1}λ; else abort. Next, set Fstate ← sent, store (sid,G,D, s0, s1) and send the message (created, sid,
G,D) to the adversary.
Deliver. Upon receiving a message (deliver, sid, G,D) from the adversary, verify that Fstate = sent; else
abort. Next, set Fstate ← ready, and send (ready, sid, G,D) to D.
Choice. Upon receiving a message (choice, sid, G,D, c) from D check if Fstate = ready; else abort. Next,
set Fstate ← dead and send (output, sid, G,D, sc) to D.
Figure 1: The One-Time Memory functionality.
anymore. Therefore it is not possible to realize the OTM functionality based on tokens that can
receive communication from a malicious G.
OTM with Abort. Given the above fact that online changes in the abort behavior are
inherent in the setting with one-way communication into the token, we introduce an OTM
functionality with abort, see Figure 2. For such a functionality, there is an initial delivering
phase after which the adversary can only let the execution proceed correctly or switch off the
functionality whenever he wants (independent of David inputs); but he cannot change the values
stored in the functionality.
3 The Case of Incoming Communication
We first show that the existing solution of Do¨ttling, Kraschewski and Mu¨ller-Quade [13] for
OTM with 2 tokens can be modified to UC-realize OTM with abort. Then we show that using
a single token, it is impossible to obtain an information-theoretically secure OTM protocol, if
Goliath can send messages to the token. We sketch how a information-theoretically UC-secure
OT protocol from a single token can be obtained and give a construction of a compuationally
UC-secure OTM protocol from a single hardware token.
The formalization of the ideal functionality for stateful tamper-proof hardware tokens in
this section uses a wrapper functionality as in the previous works [20, 22, 13], but as one-way
communication from the token issuer to the token is now allowed, the wrapper functionality
needs to be modified to capture this fact. A sender G (Goliath) provides as input to F statefulwrap-owc
a deterministic Turing machine T (the token). Note that stateful tokens can be hard-coded
with sufficiently long randomness tapes. The receiver D (David) can query F statefulwrap-owc to run
T with inputs of his choice and receives the output produced by the token. The current state
of T is stored between consecutive queries. In addition, and in order to capture the one-way
communication property, we add the possibility of Goliath sending messages to the token, in
which case T is run on the received string and changes to a new state. The complete description
of the functionality is shown in Figure 3. This model captures the fact that on the one hand
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Functionality FOTM-with-Abort
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The variable Fstate is initialized with wait and Fabort with ⊤.
If any message other than (switch on, sid, G,D) is received while Fabort = ⊥, the functionality aborts.
Creation. Upon receiving a message (create, sid, G,D, s0, s1) from G verify if Fstate = wait and s0, s1 ∈
{0, 1}λ; else abort. Next, set Fstate ← sent, store (sid,G,D, s0, s1) and send the message (created, sid,
G,D) to the adversary.
Overwrite. Upon receiving a message (overwrite, sid, G,D, s′0, s
′
1) from A verify if Fstate = sent and
s′0, s
′
1 ∈ {0, 1}
λ; else abort. Set s0 ← s
′
0 ; s1 ← s
′
1.
Deliver. Upon receiving a message (deliver, sid, G,D) from the adversary, verify that Fstate = sent; else
abort. Next, set Fstate ← ready, and send (ready, sid, G,D) to D.
Choice. Upon receiving a message (choice, sid, G,D, c) from D check if Fstate = ready; else abort. Next,
set Fstate ← dead and send (output, sid, G,D, sc) to D.
Switch Off. Upon receiving a message (switch off, sid, G,D) from A set Fabort ← ⊥.
Switch On. Upon receiving a message (switch on, sid, G,D) from A, set Fabort ← ⊤.
Figure 2: The One-Time Memory with Abort functionality.
the token cannot send messages to its creator, and on the other hand David cannot access the
code or the internal state of T .
3.1 Unconditionally Secure OTM with Two Tokens
Our solution is to use the non-interactive version of the protocol due to Do¨ttling, Kraschewski
and Mu¨ller-Quade [13]. The only function of Goliath in this protocol is creating the two tokens
and sending them to David. David, on the other hand, interacts with both tokens in order
to obtain his output and to check the correctness of the protocol execution. Intuitively, one
of the tokens is used to generate a commitment to the input values and to send the input
values encrypted using one-time pads. The second token only contains a random affine function
which can be evaluated only a single time and allows David to recover the one-time pad key
corresponding to one of the inputs. The specifications of the tokens can be found in Figure 4 and
Figure 5. In the protocol David initially interacts with the token which has the inputs in order
to obtain the commitments and the ciphertexts. After this point David considers the OTM as
delivered. Then, whenever he wants to choose the input to be received, he simply queries the
token that has the affine function on the appropriate input and obtains the one-time pad that
he needs in order to recover his desired value. The description of the protocol is presented in
Figure 6.
The fact that the protocol securely realizes FOTM-with-Abort follows from a straightforward
modification of the original security proof by Do¨ttling et al. [13], which considered the same
protocol but with isolated tokens and proved that it realizes FOTM (i.e., without aborts) in such
scenario.
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Functionality F statefulwrap-owc
Parametrized by a security parameter λ and a polynomial upper bound on the runtime t(·). The variable
Fstate is initialized with wait.
Creation. Upon receiving a message (create, sid, G,D, T ) from G where T is a deterministic Turing
machine, verify if Fstate = wait; else ignore the input. Next, store (sid, G, D, T ,Tstate) where Tstate is the
initial state of T , set Fstate ← sent and send the message (created, sid, G,D) to the adversary.
Deliver. Upon receiving a message (deliver, sid, G,D) from the adversary, verify that Fstate = sent; else
ignore the input. Next, set Fstate ← ready, and send (ready, sid, G,D) to D.
Execution. Upon receiving a message (execute, sid, G,D, x) from D where x is an input, check if
Fstate = ready and if it is, then run T (Tstate, x) for at most t(λ) steps. Save the new state of T in Tstate,
read the output y from its output tape and send (output, sid, G,D, y) to D.
Incoming Communication. Upon receiving a message (communication, sid, G,D,m) from A, run
T (Tstate,m) for at most t(λ) steps. Save the new state of T .
Figure 3: The wrapper functionality allowing one-way communication.
Token - Random Values TRandom
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The token is hardwired with a random vector a
$
← F2λ2 and a
random matrix B
$
← F2λ×2λ2 . It is initialized with state Tstate = ready.
Output. Upon receiving a message (choice, z) from D check if Tstate = ready; else abort. Next, set
Tstate ← dead, compute V ← a⊗ z +B and send the message (output, V ) to D.
Figure 4: The first token, which only contains random values.
Theorem 3.1 In the model where a malicious Goliath is allowed to send messages to the token,
the protocol presented in Figure 6 UC-realizes the functionality FOTM-with-Abort with statistical
security against a corrupted Goliath and perfect security against a corrupted David.
Proof: (Sketch) The correctness as well as the security against a corrupted David follow di-
rectly from Do¨ttling’s et al. proof of security. In the case of the security against a corrupted
Goliath, note that the OTM is considered delivered at the point in which David has received
(G, a˜, B˜, s˜0, s˜1) from TInputs. From that point on, TInputs does not participate in the protocol
anymore and it cannot send messages to the outside world. Hence neither Goliath nor TRandom
know the matrix C which is used for the commitments, so they can cheat in the commitment’s
opening phase only with negligible probability. Both of them also do not know the value h,
which is necessary together with z in order to determine David’s input x. So the proof proceeds
as in [13], the only difference here is that Goliath can still send messages to TRandom at any
point, and thus he can modify the abort behavior. This can be dealt with by running Do¨ttling’s
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Token - Inputs TInputs
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The token is initialized with Goliath’s inputs s0, s1, and the
vector a and matrix B that are used by TRandom. It is initialized in state Tstate = ready.
Matrix Choice. Upon receiving a message (matrix choice, C) from D check if Tstate = ready and
C ∈ Fλ×2λ2 ; else abort. Next, compute a matrix G ∈ F
λ×2λ
2 that is complementary to C (i.e., G is
determined by λ vectors of length 2λ which are linearly independent and G spans a subspace of the
kernel of C), and also compute a˜ ← Ca, B˜ ← CB. Set Tstate ← committed and send the message
(commitment, G, a˜, B˜) to D.
Ciphertexts. Upon receiving a message (vector choice, h) from D check if Tstate = committed and
h ∈ F2λ2 \ {0}; else abort. Next, compute s˜0 ← s0 + GBh and s˜1 ← s1 + GBh + Ga, set Tstate ← dead
and send the message (output, s˜0, s˜1) to D.
Figure 5: The second token, which stores Goliath’s inputs.
et al. procedure to verify whether the token is going to abort or not (i.e., running a copy of the
token in its current state with random inputs) after each incoming message from Goliath to the
token. If the simulator notices that the abort behavior changed, he can make the appropriate
change in FOTM-with-Abort by using the Switch Off/Switch On commands.
Sequential OTM with Abort. As done by Do¨ttling et al. [13] for the OTM functionality, it
is also possible to define a sequential version of the OTM-with-Abort functionality where there
are many pairs of Goliath’s inputs (i.e., there are multiple stages) which can only be queried
sequentially by David. The functionality only needs to be modified to take pairs of inputs
which can be queried sequentially by David and to allow an adversary to specify which stages
are active/inactive at any time (if an inactive stage is queried by David, then the functionality
aborts). In this case the two token solution of Do¨ttling et al. [13] for sequential OTMs can be
used. The security proof would be a straightforward modification of Do¨ttling et al.’s proof in
the same line as done above.
3.2 Impossibility of Unconditionally Secure OTM from a Single Token
Lemma 3.2 Assume that there is only one token and that a malicious token is not computa-
tionally bounded. If a malicious Goliath is allowed to send messages to the token, then there is
no protocol Π that realizes OTM with information-theoretic security from this single token.
Proof: For the sake of contradiction assume that a correct and information-theoretically secure
OTM protocol Π from a single stateful token exists. Assume that the parties’ inputs are chosen
as s0, s1
$
← {0, 1}λ and c
$
← {0, 1}. The sender’s privacy of the OTM protocol should hold, i.e.
I(viewD; s1−c) ≤ ε ⇔ H(s1−c)−H(s1−c |viewD) ≤ ε
⇔ H(s1−c |viewD) ≥ λ− ε,
where viewD is David’s view of the protocol execution and ε is a function that is negligible in
the security parameter.
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Protocol
Parametrized by a security parameter λ.
Deliver. D waits until G send the tokens TRandom and TInputs. Then he chooses a random matrix
C ∈ Fλ×2λ2 and sends the message (matrix choice, C) to TInputs in order to get the answer (commitment,
G, a˜, B˜). After that, D picks a random vector h ∈ F2λ2 \ {0} and sends the message (vector choice, h) to
TInputs in order to get the output (output, s˜0, s˜1).
Choice Phase. When D gets his input c ∈ F2, he chooses z
$
← F2λ2 such that z
Th = c and sends the
message (choice, z) to TRandom to get the output (output, V ). Then D checks if CV = a˜z
T + B˜. If it is
not, D aborts; otherwise, he outputs sc = s˜c +GV h.
Figure 6: The unconditionally secure protocol that realizes FOTM-with-Abort.
By definition of the OTM functionality David can choose his input c at any time after he receives
the token and Goliath should not learn when David queried the OTM functionality. So David
can choose his input c at a point in the future far after receiving the token, when all initial
communication between the parties is already finished, and then he interacts with the token to
receive sc. But then, at the moment right before David’s choice c is made, its entropy is still
1 from the point of view of all parties. Therefore, due to the sender’s privacy, at this point it
should hold that
H(s0 |view
′
D) ≥ λ− ε
and
H(s1 |view
′
D) ≥ λ− ε,
where view′
D
is David’s view of the protocol execution until this point. But if a malicious
Goliath is allowed to send messages to the token, he can forward his complete view to the token.
The token then gets to know all protocol interactions so far and due to the correctness of the
OTM protocol (i.e., it should work for any pair of inputs in {0, 1}λ) he is able, for almost any
s′c ∈ {0, 1}
λ, to find a strategy to follow for the rest of the protocol that makes David accept s′c.
Hence the values s0 and s1 are not fixed up to the point when David inputs c. But in the OTM
functionality the values s0 and s1 are fixed once it is sent, and thus we get a contradiction.
3.3 Unconditionally Secure OT with a Single Token
Do¨ttling et al. [13] also presented an unconditionally secure solution with one token only, in
which the interactions which are performed between David and TInputs in the previously described
protocol are instead performed between David and Goliath in an initial interactive phase that
is used to send the commitments and the ciphertexts. Note that such a version of the protocol
would not be secure in the setting where one-way communication is allowed into the token since
Goliath could simply forward the matrix C to TRandom, which would then be able to open the
commitments to any value and thus be able to change the outputs at any time. But we should
mention that it is possible to obtain an oblivious transfer protocol with only one token by letting
the single token act like TInputs in the above protocol and letting the interactions between David
and TRandom be replaced by identical interactions between David and Goliath. The proof of
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Token T
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The token is hardwired with the shares (vi,0, vi,1) for i = 1, . . . , λ,
the inputs s0, s1 and Goliath’s public key pk. It is initialized with state Tstate = ready and j = 0.
Message Commitment. Upon receiving a message (challenge, kj) from D check if Tstate = ready and
kj is a bit; else abort Set j ← j + 1. If j = λ, then set Tstate ← message committed. Send the message
(message commitment, vj,kj ) to D.
Inputs Commitment. Upon receiving a message (commit, crs, σ) from D check if Tstate =
message committed and if σ is a valid signature of G on crs; else abort. Set Tstate ← inputs committed.
Commit to the values s0, s1 using a computationally UC-secure commitment protocol that uses the com-
mon reference string crs and send the commitments to D. Let d0, d1 denote the information to open the
commitments.
Output. Upon receiving the message output from D check if Tstate = inputs committed; else abort. Next,
set Tstate ← dead and execute with D a computationally UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol using the
common reference string crs and with inputs (s0‖d0, s1‖d1).
Figure 7: The token for a computationally secure OTM protocol with a single token.
security would follow in the same line as before since Goliath would never get to know C and h.
Note that the drawback of having to know the OT inputs before sending the token can be easily
overcome by performing the OTs with random inputs and derandomizing them afterwards.
3.4 Computationally Secure OTM from a Single Token
If one considers the scenario where only one token is available, it is possible to obtain a protocol
that realizes FOTM-with-Abort with computational security. The idea is to compute as an initial
step (i.e. during the delivery phase) the commitment functionality by using the token and inter-
actions between Goliath and David. With access to this commitment functionality it is possible
to obtain a common reference string between David and the token2, which in turn allows to
run a computationally secure UC-commitment protocol between them in order to commit to
the input values. After receiving from the token the commitments to the input values, David
considers the delivery complete, and whenever he wants to get his output he just executes an
oblivious transfer protocol with the token with his desired choice bit as input. He checks the
correctness of the output using the commitment. The crucial point for the simulation to go
through is that the simulator should be able to extract the first commitment before its opening,
so that he can choose the common reference string as he wishes. In order to accomplish that
in face of a potentially malicious token which possibly only correctly answers queries to certain
values, we will commit to a message m by using λ pairs of random shares (vi,0, vi,1) where for
each pair vi,0 + vi,1 = m. During the committing phase, D interacts with the token and can
choose to receive either vi,0 or vi,1 for each pair. To open the commitment, G reveals all the
shares. The specification of the token can be found in Figure 7 and of the protocol in Figure 8.
2The common reference string is actually obtained by Goliath and David, but can be forwarded from Goliath
to the token via David by using a digital signature to ensure that the value that the token obtains is exactly the
same one that Goliath sent.
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Protocol
Parametrized by a security parameter λ.
Deliver. G generates a pair of signing sk and public pk keys for a signature scheme. Then he picks
a random message m′
$
← Fλ2 and random vectors vi,0
$
← Fλ2 for i = 1, . . . , λ and sets vi,1 = m
′ − vi,0.
He creates the token T (described in Figure 7) with the hardwired vectors (vi,0, vi,1), s0, s1 and pk, and
sends it to D. Upon receiving the token T , D queries it with random bits ki for i = 1, . . . , λ in order to
get vi,ki . D picks a random message m
′′
$
← Fλ2 and sends it to G. Then G opens the commitment to m
′
by sending all the shares (vi,0, vi,1) to D. D checks if m
′ = vi,0 + vi,1 for all i = 1, . . . , λ, aborting the
protocol if this is not the case. Both G and D use m = m′ +m′′ to generate a common reference string
crs. G signs crs with his signing key sk and sends the signature σ to D. D sends crs and σ to T in order
to receive the commitments to s0 and s1.
Choice Phase. When D gets his input c ∈ F2, he sends the message output to T and executes a
computationally UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol with the token using the common reference string
crs and with input c in order to get the output sc‖dc, where ‖ denotes concatenation. D checks the
correctness of sc using the commitment that he received previously and the opening information dc.
Figure 8: The computationally secure OTM protocol using one token.
Theorem 3.3 In the model where a malicious Goliath is allowed to send messages to the token,
the protocol presented in Figure 8 UC-realizes the functionality FOTM-with-Abort with computa-
tional security.
Proof: The correctness of the protocol can be trivially verified. The simulation for the cases
that both parties are corrupted or no parties are corrupted are trivial. We describe below how
the simulation proceeds in the other cases.
Corrupted Sender: If Goliath is corrupted (and thus also the token), the simulator will
simulate an interaction of the protocol with the adversary and has to extract both s0 and s1
from this interaction in order to give them as input for the OTM functionality. The main reason
to do this is that the simulator should be able to extract the value m′ before sending m′′, so
that he can choose the common reference string crs as he wishes, thus being able to create a
trapdoor to extract s0 and s1 from the committed values.
We have that only Goliath can program the token, so the environment machine will provide
the code to Goliath (and hence to the simulator). To extract the value m′ the simulator does
the following. When the commitment step happens, whenever David sends a valid message
(challenge, kj) to receive a share v˜j,kj , the simulator first executes the token with the input
1− kj, obtaining an answer v˜j,1−kj , and then resets the token to the point before this query and
executes the token with input kj to obtain v˜j,kj and forward it to David. Let m˜
′
j = v˜j,0 + v˜j,1.
After all the λ challenges are done, the simulator fixes m˜′ as the value that appeared more often
in the tuple (m˜′1, . . . , m˜
′
λ). He then chooses m
′′ = m− m˜′ for any m he wants. Lets now analyze
this extraction procedure. Let (vˆj,0, vˆj,1) denote the values that Goliath reveals in the opening
phase. Note that the protocol will be aborted unless vˆj,0 + vˆj,1 = mˆ
′ for all j and some fixed
message mˆ′. For any j, if vˆj,0 6= v˜j,0 and vˆj,1 6= v˜j,1 then the protocol will be aborted anyway
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and we do not need to worry about the extracted value. If for the majority of the j’s it holds
that vˆj,0 = v˜j,0 and vˆj,1 = v˜j,1, then m˜
′ = mˆ′ and thus the extraction procedure works properly.
The remaining case is the one in which at least half of the j’s are such that either vˆj,0 = v˜j,0
or vˆj,1 = v˜j,1, but not both equalities hold. For each such j the probability that the opening
check succeeds for this pair of vectors is 1/2 since Goliath cannot get any information from the
token. Therefore if half or more of the j’s are in this condition, the protocol will abort with
overwhelming probability in the security parameter λ.
Given that the extraction worked properly, the simulator can create the common reference string
as he wishes and so he is able to have a trapdoor to extract the values s0 and s1 from the com-
mitments and give them as input to the OTM functionality. To learn the abort behavior, the
simulator simulates, at onset and also after each incoming message from Goliath to the token,
a choice phase execution between David and the token. The simulator can then use the Switch
Off/Switch On commands to adapt FOTM-with-Abort’s abort behavior properly.
Corrupted Receiver: If David is corrupted, the simulator gets to know all David’s challenges
kj in the first commitment. Hence, after seeing m
′′, he can choose any m′ he wants (and thus
any resulting m and crs) and appropriate shares (vˆj,0, vˆj,1) that are correct from David’s point
of view. By picking a common reference string together with an appropriate trapdoor, the
simulator can learn the choice bit c and query it to the functionality FOTM-with-Abort to learn sc.
Using the equivocability of the UC-commitment the simulator can find an appropriate opening
information dc and feed sc‖dc to David in the OT protocol.
Note that the above protocol can be trivially extended to the case of sequential OTMs.
4 The Case of Outgoing Communication
In the complementary problem, we consider tokens which have a one-way channel that allow
them to send messages to Goliath, but which cannot receive any information from Goliath. In
this scenario we would like to implement FOTM. Note that in this case Goliath cannot control
online the abort behavior of the token. We first show an impossibility result for unconditionally
secure protocols and then present a computationally secure protocol using a single token.
4.1 Impossibility of Information-Theoretically Secure OT(M)
Lemma 4.1 If the tokens can send messages to Goliath, then there is no protocol Π that realizes
OTM, or even oblivious transfer, with information-theoretic security.
Proof: (Sketch) The basic idea is that the malicious tokens send their complete view to Goliath
after each interaction with David. Thus, independently of whether Goliath or some token receive
the last protocol message, the combined view of Goliath and the tokens is available to a malicious
Goliath. This directly implies that an OT protocol with information-theoretical security is not
possible, because the whole model collapses to the two-party case in the stand-alone setting.
Either the complete transcript of the exchanged messages (which is available to a malicious
Goliath) uniquely determines the choice-bit c of David or a malicious David can obtain both
input bits (s0, s1), and in both cases the oblivious transfer security is broken.
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Token T
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The token is hardwired with the shares (vn,i,0, vn,i,1) for
i = 1, . . . , 2λ, n = 1, . . . , λ and an opening key cok ∈ {0, 1}λ. It is initialized with state Tstate = ready.
Shares Opening. Upon receiving a message (challenge, n1, . . . , nλ/2) from D check if Tstate = ready and
{n1, . . . , nλ/2} ⊂ {1, . . . , λ} are the specifications of the shares D wants to be revealed; else abort. Set
Tstate ← message committed. Send the message (shares opening, (vnj ,i,0, vnj ,i,1)j=1,...,λ/2,i=1,...,2λ) to D.
Message Opening. Upon receiving a message (reveal message, cok) from D check if Tstate =
message committed and cok = cok; else abort. Set Tstate ← message opened. Send the message (opening,
(vn,i,0, vn,i,1)n=1,...,λ,i=1,...,2λ) to D.
Figure 9: The token for the commitment protocol with outgoing communication.
We remark that the crucial point here is that for oblivious transfer, it does not matter
at which time Goliath gets the complete view, i.e. it does not matter whether some token or
Goliath receive the last message. As soon as he learns the choice bit, the protocol is broken. This
argumentation, however, does not rule out information-theoretically UC-secure commitments.
4.2 Unconditionally Secure Commitment with a Single Token
The idea here is to commit to a message m by using pairs of random shares (vi,0, vi,1) such
that for each pair vi,0 + vi,1 = m, the shares are known to both the token and Goliath. The
commitment phase is done by interactions between David and Goliath, where for each pair
David can choose to receive either vi,0 or vi,1. In order to guarantee the binding property,
the opening phase is executed between David and the token: David receives an opening key
from Goliath and forwards it to the token, who checks it and reveals all the shares to David.
To guarantee that on the one hand David cannot guess the opening key correctly (and thus
open the commitment whenever he wants), but on the other hand the opening key does not
contain enough information to allow the token to learn David’s choices during the commitment
phase (and thus successfully open the commitment to any value), we have opening keys that are
random λ-bit strings and we use 2λ pairs of random shares. This commitment scheme is secure,
but not yet extractable. In order to get extractability, instead of committing to the message
itself, we first use the (λ, λ/2 + 1)-Shamir’s secret share scheme to create λ shares (m1, . . . ,mλ)
of the message, then commit to each share using the above scheme (in the opening phase a
single opening key of λ-bits is given to the token in order to open all the commitments), but we
additionally make David ask the token to open λ/2 shares mn1 , . . . mnλ/2 (without sending the
opening key) already in the commitment phase, which do not reveal any information about m.
The specification of the token can be found in Figure 9 and of the protocol in Figure 10.
Theorem 4.2 In the model where malicious tokens are allowed to send messages to Goliath,
the protocol presented in Figure 10 UC-realizes the commitment functionality FCOM with un-
conditional security.
The proof is in Appendix A.
11
Commitment Protocol
Parametrized by a security parameter λ.
Commitment Phase. G generates an opening key cok
$
← Fλ2 . Then he generates λ shares (m1, . . . ,mλ)
of the message m using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. For each share mn, G picks random vectors
vn,i,0
$
← Fλ2 for i = 1, . . . , 2λ and sets vn,i,1 = mn− vn,i,0. He creates the token T (described in Figure 9)
with the hardwired cok and vectors (vn,i,0, vn,i,1) for n = 1, . . . , λ, i = 1, . . . , 2λ, and sends it to D. Upon
receiving the token T , D queries G with random bits kn,i for n = 1, . . . , λ, i = 1, . . . , 2λ in order to
get vn,i,kn,i . Then D picks a random subset {n1, . . . , nλ/2} ⊂ {1, . . . , λ} and asks the token to reveal
(vnj ,i,0, vnj ,i,1) for j = 1, . . . , λ/2, i = 1, . . . , 2λ, which he checks against the information he received from
G; aborting if they do not match.
Opening Phase. G sends to D the message shares (m1, . . . ,mλ) and also the commitment opening key
cok, which D forwards to T in order to get all the shares (vn,i,0, vn,i,1). D checks if mn = vn,i,0 + vn,i,1
for all i and n, aborting the protocol if this is not the case. Then he reconstructs m from the shares;
aborting if m is not uniquely determined by the shares.
Figure 10: The unconditionally secure commitment protocol using one token for the case of
outgoing communication.
4.3 Computationally Secure OTM with a Single Token
For the case of computational security, it is possible to obtain an OTM protocol which uses only
one token. The approach is briefly described below. Using the ideas from the previous section
the parties can compute the commitment functionality, which can then be used to establish
a common reference string between David and the token. The common reference string in
turn can be used to run computationally UC-secure commitments and OT protocols between
the token and David. The token commits to the input values using the computationally UC-
secure commitment protocol, at which point David considers the deliver complete. Afterwards,
whenever David wants to obtain his output, he engages in a computationally UC-secure OT
protocol with the token in order to get the desired output and the commitment verification
information.
Theorem 4.3 In the model where malicious tokens are allowed to send messages to Goliath,
there is a protocol using a single token which UC-realizes the functionality FOTM with compu-
tational security.
The description of the token and the protocol, as well as the security proof can be found in
Appendix B.
5 Conclusion
In this work we investigated a weaker isolation model for tamper-proof hardware, namely one-
way (broadband) communication channels are allowed either for the token creator to the tokens
or in the opposite direction. In the case that the tokens can receive incoming communication
from their creators we showed the following: (1) there is an unconditionally secure One-Time
Memory (OTM) protocol using two tokens, (2) it is impossible to realize OTMwith unconditional
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security from a single token, (3) there is an unconditionally secure oblivious transfer protocol
using a single token, (4) there is a computationally secure OTM protocol using a single token.
In the case that the tokens can send outgoing communication to their creator we showed the
following: (1) it is impossible to realize OTM or oblivious transfer with unconditional security,
(2) there is an unconditionally secure commitment protocol using a single token, (3) there is a
computationally secure OTM protocol using a single token.
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A Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof: The correctness of the protocol is trivial, as well as the simulation for the cases that
both parties are corrupted or no parties are corrupted. We describe below how the simulation
proceeds in the other cases.
Corrupted Sender: We have that only Goliath can program the token, so the environment
machine will provide the code to Goliath (and hence to the simulator). To extract the value m
the simulator does the following when David asks the token to open λ/2 shares mn1 , . . . mnλ/2
of m during the commitment step. Let Q0 denote the subset that David chose to be opened.
First note that given the token’s answer to any opening query and the commitment information
received during the interaction with Goliath, it is possible to distinguish with overwhelming
probability if the token opened the shares correctly or not. So the simulator first tests if the
query Q0 was answered correctly by the token. If Q0 is not answered correctly by the token,
we do not need to worry about the extraction since the protocol will be aborted anyway. If it
was answered correctly, the simulator also runs internally other executions of this procedure for
opening half of the shares, in each of them asking a random subset Q1, Q2, . . . (with |Qi| = λ/2)
of the shares to be opened (the token is started in each execution from the same state that it
was in just before Q0 and there is a fixed exponential upper bound on the number of executions
that can be performed). The procedure is repeated until some Qj is answered correctly. Note
that the probability that the token answers any of the queries Q0, Q1, . . . correctly is the same
since they are chosen from the same distribution and let p denote this probability. If p is not
negligible, then the expected numbers of iterations needed to find a second query Qj that is
answered correctly is polynomial. From Q0 and Qj the simulator can recover mˆ (the unique
value that can possibly be accepted with non-negligible probability in the tests performed in
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the commitment’s opening phase). If m 6= mˆ, we do not need to worry about the extraction
since the protocol will be aborted anyway. Therefore the simulator can perform the extraction
correctly with overwhelming probability.
Corrupted Receiver: If David is corrupted, the simulator gets to know all David’s challenges
kn,i as well as which shares of m were opened. Hence after the commitment phase he can still
choose any mˆ he wants and appropriate shares (mˆ1, . . . , mˆλ) and (vˆn,i,0, vˆn,i,1) that will be
accepted by David in the opening phase.
B Computationally Secure OTM with a Single Token
Here we describe the computationally secure OTM protocol with a single token in the case of
outgoing communication. It uses the commitment protocol as a building block. We describe the
full protocol for the sake of completeness.
As in the protocol presented in Section 3.4, the idea is to use initial interactions (i.e., during
the delivering phase) between Goliath and David, and also between David and the token in
order to compute the commitment functionality and use it to establish a common reference
string between David and the token, which can then be use to run computationally UC-secure
commitment and OT protocols between the token and David. The token then commits to the
input values, at which point David considers the deliver complete. Afterwards, whenever David
wants to obtain his output, he engages in a computationally UC-secure OT protocol with the
token in order to get the desired output and the commitment verification information. The
specification of the token can be found in Figure 11 and of the protocol in Figure 12.
Theorem B.1 The protocol presented in Figure 12 UC-realizes the functionality FOTM with
computational security.
Proof: The correctness of the protocol is trivial, as well as the simulation for the cases that
both parties are corrupted or no parties are corrupted. We describe below how the simulation
proceeds in the other cases.
Corrupted Sender: If Goliath is corrupted (and thus also the token), the simulator should
be able to extract both s0 and s1 to give them as input to the OTM functionality. In short,
the simulator should be able to extract the value m′ before sending m′′, so that he can choose
the common reference string crs as he wishes, thus being able to create a trapdoor to extract s0
and s1 from the committed values. The extraction happens in the same way as in the proof in
Appendix A and the expected polynomial time simulator can perform the extraction correctly
with overwhelming probability.
If the extraction works properly, the simulator is able to choose the common reference string
and therefore is able to have a trapdoor that allows him to extract the values s0 and s1 from
the commitments. To learn about the abort behavior during the choice phase, the simulator
simulates a choice phase between David and the token with random inputs. Hence he is able to
forward the correct inputs to the OTM functionality.
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Token T
Parametrized by a security parameter λ. The token is hardwired with the shares (vn,i,0, vn,i,1) for
i = 1, . . . , 2λ, n = 1, . . . , λ, the inputs s0, s1, Goliath’s public key pk and an opening key cok ∈ {0, 1}
λ.
It is initialized with state Tstate = ready.
Shares Opening. Upon receiving a message (challenge, n1, . . . , nλ/2) from D check if Tstate = ready and
{n1, . . . , nλ/2} ⊂ {1, . . . , λ} are the specifications of the shares D wants to be revealed; else abort. Set
Tstate ← message committed. Send the message (shares opening, (vnj ,i,0, vnj ,i,1)j=1,...,λ/2,i=1,...,2λ) to D.
Message Opening. Upon receiving a message (reveal message, cok) from D check if Tstate =
message committed and cok = cok; else abort. Set Tstate ← message opened. Send the message (opening,
(vn,i,0, vn,i,1)n=1,...,λ,i=1,...,2λ) to D.
Inputs Commitment. Upon receiving a message (commit, crs, σ) from D check if Tstate =
message opened and if σ is a valid signature of G on crs; else abort. Set Tstate ← inputs committed.
Commit to the values s0, s1 using a computationally UC-secure commitment protocol that uses the com-
mon reference string crs and send the commitments to D. Let d0, d1 denote the information to open the
commitments.
Output. Upon receiving the message output from D check if Tstate = inputs committed; else abort. Next,
set Tstate ← dead and execute with D a computationally UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol using the
common reference string crs and with inputs (s0‖d0, s1‖d1).
Figure 11: The token for the OTM protocol with outgoing communication.
Corrupted Receiver: If David is corrupted, the simulator gets to know all David’s challenges
kn,i in the first commitment as well as which shares of m
′ were opened. Hence, after seeing
m′′, he can choose any mˆ′ he wants (and thus any resulting m and crs) and appropriate shares
(mˆ′1, . . . , mˆ
′
λ) and (vˆn,i,0, vˆn,i,1) that are correct from David’s point of view. By picking a common
reference string together with an appropriate trapdoor, the simulator can learn the choice bit
c and query it to the functionality FOTM to learn sc. Using the equivocability of the UC-
commitment the simulator can find an appropriate opening information dc and feed sc‖dc to
David in the OT protocol.
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Protocol
Parametrized by a security parameter λ.
Deliver. G generates a pair of signing sk and public pk keys for a signature scheme and also an opening
key cok
$
← Fλ2 . Then he picks a random message m
′
$
← Fλ2 and generates the λ shares of it (m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
λ)
using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. For each share m′n, G picks random vectors vn,i,0
$
← Fλ2 for
i = 1, . . . , 2λ and sets vn,i,1 = m
′
n − vn,i,0. He creates the token T (described in Figure 9) with the
hardwired s0, s1, pk, cok and vectors (vn,i,0, vn,i,1) for n = 1, . . . , λ, i = 1, . . . , 2λ, and sends it to D.
Upon receiving the token T , D queries G with random bits kn,i for n = 1, . . . , λ, i = 1, . . . , 2λ in order
to get vn,i,kn,i . Then D picks a random subset {n1, . . . , nλ/2} ⊂ {1, . . . , λ} and ask the tokens to reveal
(vnj ,i,0, vnj ,i,1) for j = 1, . . . , λ/2, i = 1, . . . , 2λ, which he checks against the information he received from
G; aborting if they do not match. D picks a random message m′′
$
← Fλ2 and sends it to G. G sends to
D the message shares (m′1, . . . ,m
′
λ) and also the commitment opening key cok, which D forwards to T
in order to get all the shares (vn,i,0, vn,i,1). D checks if m
′
n = vn,i,0 + vn,i,1 for all i and n, aborting the
protocol if this is not the case. Then he reconstruct m′ from the shares; aborting if m′ is not uniquely
determined by the shares. Both G and D use m = m′ +m′′ to generated a common reference string crs.
G signs crs with his signing key sk and sends the signature σ to D. D sends crs and σ to T in order to
receive the commitments to s0 and s1.
Choice Phase. When D gets his input c ∈ F2, he sends the message output to T and execute with the
token a computationally UC-secure oblivious transfer protocol using the common reference string crs and
with input c in order to get the output sc‖dc. D checks the correctness of sc using the commitment that
he received previously and the opening information dc.
Figure 12: The computationally secure OTM protocol using one token for the case of outgoing
communication.
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